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Abstract
This study provides an investigation into the differences in the postdisplacement labor market experiences of workers separated from declining traded, expanding traded and
nontraded industries. The results presented provide the beginnings of a bridge across the
gap between what is known and what is perceived regarding the allocative efficiency effects
of trade-related labor displacements. The strategy of the paper is to relate the postdisplacement experience of individuals to changes in the competitive position of the industry
from which the individual was displaced. The investigative lens is primarily focused on the
impact of changing industry competitiveness on the duration of unemployment spells and
the change in wages accompanying displacement.
The findings are that workers from traded industries in general suffer greater hardship after displacement than do nontraded workers. They incur both a longer spell of unemployment and

a. greater loss of earnings.

Within traded industries, workers separated from

declining traded industries fare much worse than those from expanding traded industries.
This evidence regarding the duration of the unemployment spell is then combined
with previous results regarding trade related displacements to provide an accounting of the
change in the aggregate number of weeks of unemployment resulting from changing trade
patterns. The finding is that although expansion of traded industries was sufficient to offset
the displacement effects of contracting traded industries, the longer spell of unemployment
by those from contracting industries results in a significant increase unemployed resources.

THE EFFECT OF TRADE INDUCED DISPLACEMENT
ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
Jon D. Haveman
June, 1999

1. Introduction

The decade of the 1980s was fraught with charges that international trade was stealing jobs from the U.S. economy. Indeed, the AFL-CIO asserts that:
"Millions of well-paying and high-quality job opportunities
in the middle tier of the nation's income structure have been
sacrificed as a result of America's trade decline." 1
Haveman (1992) provides an extensive analysis of the change in the volume of displaced
workers arising from changes in trade patterns. While displacements are not synonymous
with jobs or employment, they do provide a reasonable indicator of the forces exerted by
trade on jobs and employment. The analysis presented there finds that the adjustment to
the changes in comparative advantage that took place during the 1980s served to reduce the
overall number of individuals displaced during the 1980s. This result suggests that perhaps
employment in-the United States was not affected to the extent that rhetoric would have us
believe.
Despite this evidence, few would suggest that the pattern of employment in the
United States has not been altered by changes in the global trading system. As is clear
from Appendix A, jobs were lost in the early 1980s and jobs were created in the latter part
of the 1980s. 2 Although the analysis suggests insignificant changes in overall employment,
the distribution of employment, both intertemporally and across industries, has clearly been
altered by changing trade patterns.
1 The Pocketbook Issues: AFL-CIO Policy Recommendations for 1992, pg. 16.
2 This is consistent with the findings of Singleton (1990).

1

z ,This paper attempts to determine whether the cost of jobs lost is greater than the
benefits associated with job gains. These costs and benefits are measured in terms of weeks
of unemployment and changes in wages for displaced individuals. The analysis builds on the
assumption that an industry or time period that benefits from changing trade patterns experiences fewer displacements and, conversely, declining industries and time periods experience
a larger number of displacements. The question is, if changing trade patterns result in no,
or almost no, change in the number of displacements, but instead result in a transfer of displacements from one industry to another, what implications does this have for the aggregate
number of weeks of unemployment? I.e., does this particular reshuffiing of displacements
from expanding to declining traded industries result in significantly longer or shorter spells
of unemployment? Does it result in larger or smaller changes in observed wages?
The analysis presented below makes use of the results found in Haveman (1992)
to identify individuals who are likely to have been displaced by changes in the pattern of
international trade. 3 The sample of observations on displaced workers is divided into three
subsamples: those from declining traded industries, those from expanding traded industries,
and those from nontraded industries.

This categorization is based on the particular year

and industry of displacement. The subsequent analysis focuses on the extent to which the
postdisplacement labor market experiences of individuals differ across these three categories.
A subsequent ~counting of the change in the aggregate number of weeks of UIiemployment
resulting from changing trade patterns is performed.
The investigation of the differences in postdisplacement experiences will be decomposed into two sources. The first source is the extent to which workers displaced from
different industries are characterized by observable traits that would lead to longer spells of
unemployment or that are more likely to result in larger wage changes. The second source is
the extent to which the type of industry, controlling for observable individual-specific characteristics, matters for the postdisplacement experience. The extent to which workers with
3 Reproduced for reference in Appendix A.

,'.

identical demographic characteristics face a greater struggle when displaced from declining
traded industries will be taken as evidence of a greater need for assistance to trade displaced
workers. The presence of such differences is put forth as justification for a program, such as
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, which provides additional unemployment
benefits to workers whose displacement is determined to be trade-related.

In order to justify a call for special adjustment assistance to workers displaced by
trade, one needs to show that these workers suffer undue hardship. 4 Previous studies have
found evidence that workers displaced by trade do tend to exhibit greater difficulty than other
displaced workers.

This result is, however, generally based on the observation that trade

displaced workers possess characteristics that increase the difficulty of obtaining subsequent
employment. This in itself is insufficient reason for trade-related assistance and suggests
merely assistance related to an individuals characteristics. This study searches specifically
for some intrinsic unobservable element associated with trade displacement that results in
greater hardship. It is the existence of such an element that justifies specific assistance,
beyond standard unemployment insurance benefits, to trade-displaced workers.
In what follows, the post-displacement labor market experience is to be represented
by the change in wages and the duration of the spell of unemployment. The next section
contains a brief theoretical discussion of why it is to be expected that trade displaced workers
might endure

a: greater degree of postdisplacement difficulty.

The following section provides

a brief summary of previous work regarding trade and worker dislocation. Section 4 will
provide a brief description of the data used, Section 5 presents descriptive statistics calculated
from the observations used in the subsequent analysis. Section 6 will discuss in some detail
the econometric methodology and the sample of observations used in the analysis presented
in Section 7. Section 8 presents a decomposition of the unemployment spells suffered by
workers from each of the three categories discussed above. Section 9 contains some general
conclusions and a discussion of implications for policy issues arising from the results.

4 Additional reasons may be to facilitate the acceptance of reduced protection for a particular industry.

2. Theory and Expectations
The a priori expectations are that individuals displaced from declining traded industries will have a more difficult postdisplacement labor market experience than those displaced
from other industries. In addition, it is expected that those displaced from expanding traded
industries would fare better than all others. As discussed above, more/less difficult will be
gauged in two ways; first, through differences in the duration of unemployment spells according to the type of industry from which the individual was displaced,. and second, through
the wages received in the postdisplacement job relative to wages in the predisplacement
job. Trade displaced workers are expected, ceteris paribus, to experience longer spells of
unemployment and a larger decline in wages, than other displaced workers.
These expectations are largely a result of human capital arguments. An individual
who has been working in a particular industry will have received training biased more towards
industry/occupation-specific skills rather than more general types of training. An individual who experiences displacement suffers an immediate erosion of the iildustry/occupationspecific portion of their human capital, leading to a decline in future wages. Despite this
erosion, the labor market will continue to view this individual as being best suited for
particular types of activities, activities comparable to those performed in the industry of
displacement.
It is hypothesized that a certain amount of substitutability exists in industry-specific

human capital. This substitutability will serve to reduce the erosion of human capital resulting from displacement. For example, an individual displaced from the auto industry may,
because of skills developed there, be more suited to working for Caterpillar, than will an
observationally equivalent individual displaced from a service oriented industry.
It is this substitutability that suggests that trade displaced workers will experience

longer spells of unemployment and larger reductions in wages than will other individuals. The
driving force behind this is a concept as fundamental as the chain of comparative advantage. 5
5 See Deardorff (1979).

5 .....
The connection with the chain of comparative advantage is as follows. For simplicity's sake,
assume there is a continuum of goods and that there are only two inputs to production,
skilled and unskilled labor. Further assume that the goods can be ranked according to the
skill intensity of the production process. Figure 1 is a representation of such a rank-ordering,
where the production of good A uses unskilled workers relatively more intensively than an
industry such as B. If we further assume that the United States is among the countries
endowed with a highly skilled labor force, comparative advantage suggests that the United
States would produce those goods in the segment [USL, USu]j the goods with the most skill
intensive production processes.
Figure 1

Continuum of Goods
Organized by Skill Intensity
of the Production Process

_____I----l
Low Skill
Intensive

A

u_sHLf-I

j"

.U..

B

High Skill
Intensive

In the event that there is a change in the skill composition of the labor force in
countries outside of the United States, this could imply a change in USL, to USL1. Note
that such a change could also result from the international flow of technology or reduced
transport costs. The United States now produces traded goods in the range [USLll USu].
The human capital substitutability hypothesis implies that individuals displaced from industry A will be the most useful (command the highest wages) should they become reemployed
in some industry in the range [A -

t:,

A

+ t:], i.e.,

in an industry "close to" A in the chain

of comparative advantage. The above change in endowments suggests that industries in
the range [USLl' USu] will expand, while industries in the range [USL, USL1] will contract.
The differential effects for workers displaced from contracting industries, relative to those
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displaced from expan ding industries,6 arise from the fact that indus
tries "close to" a declining indus try are also likely to be declining, while indus tries "close
to" expan ding indust ries
are also likely to be expan ding. Hence; the reemp loyme nt possibilities
for workers displaced
from declining traded indus tries are somew hat dimm er than for those
from expan ding traded
indus tries.

In additi on to the indus tries discussed above, the analysis will take
into account
workers displa ced from nontr aded indus tries. There is no a priori
reason ing that suggests
nontr aded indus tries will expan d or contra ct with changes in the
space U.S. manu factur ing
takes on the traded goods contin uum. It is, theref ore, conje ctured
that the postdisplacement
exper ience of those from nontr aded indus tries will be interm ediate
betwe en those displaced
from declining traded indust ries and those from expan ding traded
indus tries.

3. Previ ous Rese arch
There is a vast litera ture invest igatin g the emplo ymen t effects of chang
es in intern ational comp etition . 7 A small fractio n of this litera ture goes one step
furthe r attem pting to
charac terize the winne r and loser of changing comp etition . An even
small er litera ture exists
that looks specifically at sampl es of displaced workers.
Only one study , to my knowledge, has made use of the Displa ced
Worker Survey
(DWS) in the conte xt of changing trade patter ns. 8 ,9 Kruse (1988) provid
es a detail ed analysis
of the effects of trade displa cemen t on unem ploym ent durati on.
His result s confirm the
existe nce of a relatio nship betwe en long term impor t change, from the
early 1970s throug h the
1980s, in a manu factur ing indus try and the durati on of joblessness
for workers displaced from
that indust ry. The prima ry result is that a one percen t increase
in the impor t penet ration
I

6 As discu.ssed in Havem an( 1992), displac ements can occur in expand
ing industr ies via the exit of inefficient firms,
and through the imperle ct process of replacing volunta ry attritio
ns.
7 See Tyson et al. (1988, Ch. 2) for a survey of these studies.
8 See Tyson et al. (1988, pg. 61), for a discussion of data on trade
related displac ements origina ting within the
TAA program and studies that make use of these data.
9 Other studies have used this dataset to look at the returns
to seniorit y (Kletze r 1989), the effects of plant
closing notifica tion on the duratio n of unempl oyment (Ehrenb erg
and Jakubs on 1988 and 1989), and the general
wage and tmempl oyment consequences of displac ement (Addiso n
and Portuga l 1987 and Podgur sky and Swaim
1987a).

7 .....ratio results in a 1.25 week increase in the median duration of unemployment for workers
displaced from that industry.
This result, however, disappears when individual-specific heterogeneity is accounted
for in the specification of the model. With a more comprehensive specification, a one percent
increase in the import penetration ratio is found to increase median joblessness by a statistically insignificant .4 weeks. This result is consistent with previous studies that conclude
that workers displaced from high-import-change industries have demographic characteristics
that increase the difficulty of the postdispla.cement experience.
There are several aspects of Kruse's study that are questionable. First, there is no
direct link between changes in international competition and the sample of workers identified
as displaced from high-import-change industries. The author does find a high correlation
between high-import-change industries and long term reductions in employment. While the
decline in employment is very possibly due to increased competition, the causation could
also run the other direction. IT the domestic market is for some reason not being adequately
served by domestic producers, price will rise attracting the attention of foreign suppliers,
leading to an increase in the import penetration ratio.
Second, there is no direct link between changes in international competition and the
specific dataset employed. Given the long time span over which import change is calculated,
it is quite

pos~ible

that the adjustment to changes in competition occurred in the mid-

to-late 1970s. In this case, the trade displacement would have occurred prior to the start
of the 1984 DWS and the sample used would not accurately reflect the characteristics or
postdisplacement experience of those displaced because of trade.

4. Data

The data used in this study are from the 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990 Displaced
Workers Surveys (DWS). These surveys were conducted as supplements to the January
Current Population Surveys (CPS) of same years. These supplements are designed to provide

data pertai ning to the effects of involu ntary job loss. It asks respo
ndent s aged greate r than
19 if they lost a job within the last five years to which they have
not return ed. It then
proceeds to collect demo graph ic inform ation regard ing the previo
us job, wages, receipt of
health insura nce, full or part time status , and most impor tantly , the
reason for displacement;
reasons includ ing plant closing, slack work, the abolit ion of a positi
on, failure of a self-owned
business, the end of a seasonal job, or "othe r reasons" .10
For the purpo ses of this study, workers displa ced from full time positi
ons that were
at least 18 years old and are curren tly less than 65 years old will
be includ ed. The scope of
displa cemen ts is furthe r confined to those displa ced becau se of a plant
shutd own, slack work,
or the abolit ion of a position. 11 Not only does this restric tion on the
source of displacements
reduce proble ms of data contamination,12 but this sampl e proba bly
most closely reflects the
group of displaced workers influenced by changes in trade patter ns.
The data used to classify individuals as displaced from expan ding
or declining industri es are presen ted in Appen dix A. These data indica te wheth
er there was an increase
or decrease in displa cemen ts for each indus try in each year due to
changes in intern ationa l
comp etition . For each observation in the DWS, the indivi dual specif
ies an indus try from
which and a year in which they were displaced. If the year/i ndust
ry comb inatio n was found
to exhib it a larger numb er of displacements than it would have in
the absen ce of changing
trade patter ns,. that indivi dual is classified as displaced from a declin
ing traded industry.
Conversely, if displa cemen ts were lower, the indivi dual is classif
ied as displaced from an
expan ding traded indust ry. The remai ning observations are classif
ied as displaced from a
nontra ded indust ry.
I

10

Please see WHOO OOO?? ?????
11 This excludes workers displaced because of the end of a seasona
l job, the failme of a self-ow ned business, or
"other reasons" .
12 I.e., , through the inclusion of workers that returne d to their previous employ
er and hence were not truly
displaced.

5. Descriptive Statistics
This section provides a brief description of the displaced workers and how they differ
across the three categories of industries. Separate tables are presented for three populations
of displaced workers: (1) all observations of displaced workers in the 1980s, (2) those observations used in the unemployment regressions, and (3) the observations of reemployed
workers used in the post displacement wage equation. A more complete unweighted set of
statistics reflecting all of the data used in the econometric analysis is contained in Appendix

C.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all individuals displaced during the 1980s.
Column 1 contains statistics for the entire sample, while Columns 2, 3, and 4 describe
those from declining traded, nontraded, and expanding traded industries, separately. The
statistics are based on the restricted sample described in the previous section. For this
sample, the median duration of unemployment was 17 weeks; 78% of the individuals were
reemployed at the time of the survey; 14% had dropped out of the labor force. The average
weekly wages of those displaced was $338 (in constant 1985 dollars), 13 and, of those who
were reemployed, their post-displacement wages decreased by an average of 8.2% between
the date of displacement and the survey.
Turning to a comparison of the different categories of displaced workers, Columns 2
through 4 of Table 1, we find some striking differences. First, workers displaced from traded
,

industries (Columns 2 and 4) are more likely to have been full time workers, less likely to be
female or well educated, and are slightly older; over 17% of traded workers are over the age
of 50, as opposed to just under 13% for nontraded. They are also less likely to have been
reemployed at the survey date. 14 Of the workers who were reemployed, workers separated
froIr..

~raded

industries suffer a significant real reduction in wages, with the greatest loss going

to tn:.Jse displaced from declining traded industries. Those from declining traded industries
13 Note: this includes part time workers.
14 The observations of individuals displaced from declining traded industries were displaced an average of 2.4 years
before the survey date while all others were displaced 2.7 yeal1l prior to their respective survey dates. This
might account for some of the lower probability of reemployment at the survey date, but the large disparity in
weeks unemployed suggests that this is not an important factor.
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Table 1
Desc riptiv e Statis tics:
All Displ aced Work ers in the 19805
Variable

All

Declining
Trade d

36.2
14.0
64.2
16.3
38.8
12.6

37.1
16.4
68.1
15.7
34.7
12.2

35.6
12.8
62.6
16.0
40.5
12.7

37.9
17.8
68.4
18.3
34.7
12.2

5.2
10.4

6.4
4.6

4.6
12.8

7.2
4.3

337.8
3.8
326.9
0.8
-8.2

366.3
9.9
340.1
3.3
-16.1

328.1
1.5
323.3
-0.3
-5.4

355.8
9.3
331.0
3.5
-13.9

22.6
24.5
48.7
37.9
13.4

28.0
28.7
47.1
43.0
9.9

21.8
23.5
48.8
36.5
14.7

20.5
24.8
49.8
39.8
10.4

77.6
8.1
14.3

74.2
11.1
14.7

78.9
7.0
14.1

74.4
11.1
14.5

24,494
50.2

3,087
6.5

11,761
36.2

3,796
7.5

Nontr aded

Expanding
Traded

Demo graph ics

Age
Age> 50 (%)
Married (%)
Black (%)
Female (%)
Educa tion
Old Job

Tenure
Part Time
Wages

Old Wages
-Wag e Differential (%)
New Wages
-Wag e Differential (%)
Ll(Wage) (%)
Displa cemen t

Wks Unemployed
Censored (%)
Shutdown (%)
Slack Work (%)
Position Abolished (%)
Indust ry of Disp:

Declining Traded (%)
Expanding fTraded (%)

15.6
13.3

Emplo yment

Re-employed (%)
Unemployed (%)
Not in Labor Force (%)
N
Weighted N (mill)

Source: Calcula tions by the author from the 1984, 1986, 1988 and
1990 DWS.
A descrip tion of the above variables is contain ed in Append ix B.

11--also suffer spells of unemployment that are almost 2 months longer than all other workers,
28 weeks versus 22 weeks. This is consistent with a lower probability of being reemployed
at the survey date.
Table 2 presents the same statistics for a subset of the observations in Table 1. This
subset includes only individuals displaced from full time jobs who remain in the labor force.
This sample corresponds directly to that used in the analysis of unemployment duration in
the next section and excludes those individuals who have dropped out of the labor market.
Table 3, accordingly, presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of observations used
in the post displacement wage equations. This represents a further restriction to those
individuals who were employed, at least part time, at the survey date.
The general observations from Table 1 appear to carry over to Tables 2 and 3; except
for the duration of unemployment. Once those wha have dropped out of the labor force are
excluded, those displaced from expanding traded industries no longer exhibit the shortest
spells of unemployment. In addition, it should be noted that those displaced from declining
traded industries, Column 2 of Table 2, were relatively well paid; weekly wages for this group
were approximately 5% greater than for all other displaced workers. These individuals also
suffered the greatest decline in wages, -17.3%, as opposed to -14% for those from expanding
traded industries and a 9% decrease for those from nontraded industries.
These three tables suggest that the post-displacement experiences of trade displaced
workers do, in fact, differ significantly from other workers. They do not, however, permit one
to conclude that this is not simply due to observable characteristics. For this, one must turn
to multivariate regression techniques; such is the focus of the following sections. Consistent
with the human capital story of Section 2, workers from declining traded industries suffer
more than both those from nontraded industries and expanding traded industries. The
implication of the theory was that those displaced from expanding La.ded industries should
suffer the least hinges on the relative growth rates of the two categories. If the nontraded
industries were growing at a faster rate than the expanding traded industries, this could

·12-

Table 2
Desc riptiv e Statis tics:
Full-T ime Displ aced Work ers
Still in the Labo r Force
Variable

All

Declining
Trade d

33.3
9.1
65.2
14.9
31.5
12.7

33.8
9.5
69.3
15.1
29.0
12.4

32.8
8.3
63.0
14.3
32.7
12.9

34.9
11.7
69.6
17.0
29.2
12.3

4.8

5.8

4.1

6.7

375.7
4.6
344.6
1.7
-11.1

387.1
10.5
347.8
4.0
-17.3

371.7
1.6
345.1
0.4
-8.7

378.0
9.9
338.8
4.2
-13.9

19.2
20.1
48.4
38.1
13.5

25.8
27.1
46.3
43.7
10.0

17.2
18.1
48.8
35.9
15.3

19.5
20.0
49.2
40.3
10.5

82.5
17.5

77.0
23.0

84.1
15.9

82.2
17.8

15,402
25.4

2,887
4.8

10,225
16.6

2,290
4.8

Nontr aded

Expan ding
Trade d

Demo graph ics

Age
Age> 50
Marri ed (%)
Black (%)
Female (%)
Educa tion
Old Job

Tenure
Wages

Old Wages
-Wag e Differential (%)
New Wages
~Wage Differential (%)

~(Wage)

(%)

Displa cemen t

Wks Unemployed
Censored (%)
Shutdown (%)
Slack Work (%)
Position Abolished (%)
Indust ry of Disp:

Declining Traded (%)
Expan ding ;Traded (%)

18.9
15.8

Emplo yment

Re-employed (%)
Unemployed
N
Weighted N (mill)

Source: Calcula tions by the author from the 1984, 1986, 1988 and
1990 DWS.
A descrip tion of the above variable s is contain ed in Append ix B.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics:
Reemployed Displaced Workers
Variable

All

Declining
Traded

33.1
8.2
66.3
13.4
32.1
12.9

33.6
9.0
70.6
12.8
27.8
12.6

32.6
7.5
64.2
13.0
33.9
13.1

34.6
10.5
70.7
15.8
29.3
12.5

4.8

5.8

4.1

6.8

382.8
4.5
344.6
1.3
-11.1

401.5
10.7
347.8
3.2
-17.3

376.9
1.6
345.1
0.3
-8.7

386.6
9.7
338.8
3.6
-13.9

17.3
3.1
50.8
35.2
14.0

23.3
5.4
49.0
40.5
10.4

15.5
2.6
51.1
33.2
15.7

18.2
2.7
51.7
37.2
11.1

2,221
3.7

8,557
14.5

1,884
3.3

Nontraded

Expanding
Traded

Demographics

Age
Age> 50
Married (%)
Black (%)
Female (%)
Education
Old Job

Tenure
Wages

Old Wages
-Wage Differential (%)
New Wages
-Wage Differential (%)
Ll(Wage) (%)
Displacement

Wks Unemployed
Censored (%)
Shutdown (%)
Slack Work (%)
Position Abolished (%)
Industry of Disp:

Declining Traded (%)
Expanding Traded (%)
N
Weighted N (mill)

17.7
15.8
12,662
21.0

Source: Calculations by the author from the 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990 DWS.
A description of the above variables is contained in Appendix B.

explain the larger decline in wages for those from expan ding traded
indus tries. 15

6. Econ omet ric Meth odolo gy
The econometric analysis of this study is focused on the differences
in the postdisplacem ent experience of workers separa ted from expan ding traded
indus tries, contracting
traded indus tries, and nontr aded industries. This sections contains
a detail ed presen tation
of the methodology used to measure the effects of trade displacemen
t on unemployment
durati on and reemployment wages. In what follows, the constr uction
of the trade related
variables is discussed, followed in separa te subsections by the unem ploym
ent and wage change
methodology.
In Haveman (1992), it was determ ined for each of 29 traded indus
tries whether
changes in trade patter ns had increased or decreased the numb er
of workers displaced in
each year from 1981-1989. These results are utilize d to associate each
displaced worker into
one of the three categories listed above. Indivi duals displaced from
an indus try identified
as suffering increased displacements are categorized as displaced
from a declining traded
industry. Those displaced from industries with fewer displacemen
ts are from expanding
traded industries. The impor t and export price data are missing for
some traded industries
other than the 29 mentioned above, both for some indus tries in all years
and for only the early
1980s for other, indus tries. All individuals displaced from these indus
tries and in those years
are excluded. In additi on, observations of individuals displaced from
nontr aded industries
are also included.
In each section of analysis, two dumm y variables will be included:
TRDD EC and
TRDE XP, where
TRDD EC = {I,
0,

if displaced from a declining traded indus try,
otherwise.

TRDE XP = {I,
0,

if displaced from an expanding traded indus try,
otherwise.

and

15 Evidenc e from Carey and Franklin (1991) suggest s this to be
the case.

15
The remainder of this section discusses the use of these variables in determining the effect
of the type of industry of displacement on postdisplacement labor market experiences.

6.1 Unemployment
The equation used in the empirical analysis of unemployment duration takes the
form:

U=

g{xi.B + f(Traden

(1)

where U is the duration of the unemployment spell, which depends on the linear function in
brackets; X is a vector of individual-specific control variables, and f(·) is a function of trade
competition. In the analysis of unemployment duration, f(-) will take one of two forms;
either

f(·) = "nTRDDEC +,2 T RDEXP
or

f(·) = ,0DDISPL,
where DDISP L is the number of displaced workers attributable to trade from the same
industry in the same year as the particular observation. 16 DDISP L is continuous and positive for declining traded industries and negative for expanding industries. The larger is

DDISP L, the/larger is the pool of displaced workers with skills comparable to the displaced
individual. This results in more intense competition for jobs most appropriate for the in-

,0 is therefore expected to be
is expected that ,1 will be positive and significantly greater than ,2' The sign

dividual and consequently a longer spell of unemployment;
positive. It
of

,2 depends on the relative rates of growth in expanding traded and nontraded industries,

as discussed in the previous section, and is hence indeterminate.

In the absence of censoring, equation (1) could be estimated using ordinary least
squares techr:'":"les. The unemployment data contained in the DWS are, however, subject to
16 See Appei:

A..

censoring from two sources. First, some individuals are in the middle of their jobless spell at
the time of the survey, and second, the unemployment duration variable is topcoded at 99
weeks. This means that the actual period of joblessness, should it be incomplete or exceed
99 weeks, is unobservable. The presence of censoring requires the use of duration analysis.
Equation (1), or more generally, the relationship between the Xs (inclusive of the
trade variables), and U, the duration of unemployment, will be examined in the context of an
accelerated failure-time model. 17 More specifically, a Weibull model of duration dependence

is employed. 18 The Weibull model is a single parameter proportional hazard model, with a
hazard function, or conditional exit rate, of the following form: 19
()(x, t)

= Pr(U = tlU > t -

1)

= Aad a - 1 ,

where U is the length of the unemployment spell, t is the current week, A = e-/3' X, and a
and (3 are the parameters to be estimated. In this framework, a measures the degree of time
dependence of the hazard rate. If a = 1, the hazard rate is time invariant; a > 1 implies
a monotonically increasing hazard rate while a < 1 implies a decreasing hazard rate. A
decreasing (increasing) hazard rate means that the probability of escaping unemployment in
the next period declines (increases) over time. A value of a less than one could be the result
of either true duration dependence, or because of unobserved heterogeneity.20
The (3 parameters, in conjunction with a, measure the proportional change in the expected duration of joblessness resulting from a unit increase in the corresponding explanatory
variable, i.e.,

aEln(U)

-ax;

= (3;
a

Because of the skewed nature of the distribution of unemployment durations, it is more
appropriate to look at the effects on the expected median weeks of joblessness, which is
17 Lancaster (1990), pg. 40.
18 Other specifications such as the exponential and gamma distributions were estimated with little significant
difference in the results.
19 Lancaster (1990), pg. 44.
20 See Lancaster (1979).

1"t-calculated as
E[MU] =

« _In(.5))1/a)/ A),

for the Weibull distribution; where A = e-f3'x. The expected median weeks joblessness,
E[MU], is calculated using

a, ~, and the mean of the regressor variables.

In order to calculate

the effects of dummy variables, E[MU] is calculated first with the dummy equal to zero, and
then equal to 1. The difference is then the addition to the median weeks joblessness of the
characteristic represented by the dummy variable. 21
One consequence of this choice of model is the proportional hazard restriction. This
restriction imposes the constraint that the hazard rates of two observations with different
regressor vectors Xl and X2 will be in the same proportion ()(xI)/()(X2), for all t.

The

implication is that the importance of a particular characteristic in determining the duration
of unemployment is not permitted to change with time. This might be inappropriate for
several of the explanatory variables; for instance, high tenure on the previous job may reflect
a lack of knowledge of labor markets. This would imply inefficient search during the first
part of the unemployment spell that was not present for somebody with more recent job
search experience. The effect of an initial inefficient search would be a lower hazard or exit
rate in the first few weeks of joblessness for individuals with long predisplacement tenure.
Presumably, with the passage of time, the search would become more efficient and the
importance of tenure in determining the exit rate would diminish.
The potential for this problem also exists with respect to the predisplacement wage.
An individual displaced from a high wage industry might set an initial reservation wage
inappropriately high. With the passage of time, this reservation wage would presumably be
adjusted to a more appropriate level. Interpretation of the coefficients on these variables is
thus subject to this qualification.

21 See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) or Lancaster (1990) for additional information on the Weibull distribution.

• "1-8
Econo metric Technique

As discussed above, what is observed in the displaced worker surve
y is not U, the
actua l durati on of joblessness, but U*, where
U* _ { U, if the indivi dual is emplo yed
P + 1, if U ~ P

where P is the poten tial observable unem ploym ent durati on, i. e.,
the minim um of 99 or the
numb er of weeks between displacement and the time of the survey
.
The data on unem ploym ent therefore suffer from "right censorship"
of two types.
First, the unem ploym ent durati on variable is topco ded at 99, so
the observed durati on for
individuals unemployed for more than 99 weeks will be trunca ted.
Second, only inform ation
on the incom plete unem ploym ent spell is available for individuals
still active in the labor
marke t, yet unemployed, at the survey date. To account for this
censorship, a maxim um
likelihood estim ation techni que for the Weibull distrib ution is emplo
yed. The technique is
conce ptuall y analogous to that for Tobit analysis of norma l distrib
utions with trunca ted
observations.
If U is observed for an individual, her contri bution to the likelihood
function is simply

the proba bility densit y function of comp leted durati on,
feU) = aUa - 1 exp{- [3'x - U a exp(-[ 3'x)}.

If P < U, then' her contri bution is f(Ui*):
Prob( U/

~

Pi

+ 1) =

J

00

f(y)dy

Pi+l

= exp{ - Ui*a exp( -[3' Xi)}
The likelihood function for the entire popul ation is then
"1

L

= II aU/ a - 1 exp{ "2

X

[3' Xi - uta exp( - [3' Xi)}

IT exp{- Ui*a exp( -[3' Xi)},

19 ....

where

nl

denotes the sample of noncensored observations, and

n2

denotes the right censored

observations. 22
The choice of control variables is guided by the relevant parts of the theoretical search
literature.

In addition, TENURE, the time spent at the predisplacement job, is included

to reflect the amount of industry-specific human capital the individual has developed. It
is also possible that TENURE reflects the expectations of recall by the individual. The
reasoning is that, ceteris paribus, an individual with more experience in a given industry will
be the more desirable worker. The expected sign on TENURE is therefore positive, as the
expectation of recall rises, search effort declines, and hence the duration of unemployment
also rises, or equivalently, the escape rate from unemployment falls. 23

6.2 Changes in Wages

The second point of analysis concerns the determination of the postdisplacement
wages. In seeking to determine the differential effects of the source of displacement on
earnings, the focus will be on the following model of the change in earnings experienced by
displaced workers
lnWi,i - lnWi-l,i = h(Xjf3)

+ foi'

(2)

where Wi,i is tlle individual's current weekly earnings, Wi-I,i is the weekly predisplacement
wage and Xi is a vector of individual-specific heterogeneity, to be discussed below. The
predisplacement wage, Wi-l,i, is inflated to match the year of the current earnings. The
inflator is calculated for 2-digit census industries from annual March CPS computer tapes
and is defined simply as the annual rate of aggregate wage· growth of each industry. It is
thus assumed that the individuals wages would have grown at the same rate as that of the
average worker in the industry. The difference in wages is then the current wage less the
22 Solon (1985) employs this methodology to assess the impact of the receipt of unemployment insurance on
unemployment duration.
23 Other studies that utilize the DWS to estimate jobless duration models are KI11Be (1988) and Podgursky and
Swaim (1987& and 1987b).

expectation of wages in the undisplaced state. 24
Although the equation of primary interest is the change in wages, it should be recognized that this is a particular restriction of a more general model which explains the
postdisplacement wages:

lnUJ;o',1 = X'/3 + ""'lnUJ;o_l
/ ' , 1. + U',1
°

0

(3)

°

where Ui,j can be decomposed into two parts:
Ui,j = Aj

+ TJi,j.

Aj is the unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity component, and TJi,j is a serially un-

correlated normally distributed error component.
The equation in (2) is the following first differenced version of equation (3):
lnWi,j -

lnU'i-l,j = (Xi - Xi-d'/3 + ,(lnWi-l,j - lnU'i-2,j)

+ Vi,j,

where
Vi,j = TJi,j - TJi-l,j

and is distributed normally. Due to data limitations, the restriction that , = 0 is imposed,
i. e., that the wage effects of the previous displacement are unimportant. The extent to which

this correction is appropriate depends on the time between involuntary displacements. A
lower bound on the length of time is simply the tenure on the predisplacement job; the
undifferenced tenure variables are therefore included in the differenced regressor matrix.
The coefficient on the tenure variable will also include the effects of other elements related
to involuntary displacement; such as inefficient initial job search. It will, consequently, be
impossible to attach concrete meaning to the coefficient on the tenure variable.
Not only is this the most desirable specification for analysing the differential effects
of the industry of displacement, but it also controls for Aj, the unobserved individualspecific heterogeneity. Also presented in the analysis are the unrestricted postdisplacement
24 There are problems with this approach associated with the fact that we cannot pin down the time of displacement
within the year reported. This and other problems are dillCUSSed in Valletta (1991).
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equations and the converse restriction that the predisplacement wages are unimportant for
explaining postdisplacement wages. 25 A full complement of X variables is included in the
first differenced version of the equation to account for changes in wages that are related to
observable characteristics of the individual.
The method of estimation is designed to take into account two sources of bias inherent in a single OL5 estimation of the {3's in equation (2). The first source of bias is the
selection criterion employed in determining the sample. The sample includes only those employed, at least part time, at the survey date. If there is any systematic difference between
those employed and those remaining unemployed, the estimated coefficients will be biased
and inconsistent. The conventional two-step selectivity adjustment procedure suggested by
Heckman (1979) is therefore implemented.
The second source of bias arises from the endogeneity of the duration of unemployment in the postdisplacement wage equation. Both unemployment duration and postdisplacement wages are determined by the distribution of wage offers received. To the extent
that this distribution is not perfectly explained by the included regressor matrix, the duration of unemployment will be correlated with the error term. The correction employed
involves calculating the predicted spell of unemployment from the analysis of the previous
section. The predicted duration variable is then used as a regressor in the postdisplacement
equation (Lee J981). This approach conforms to the instrumental variables technique and
i

appropriately corrects for the endogeneity bias.
In addition to the fairly standard set of regressors, dummy variables representing the

length of time between displacement and the survey date are included. When combined with
the duration of unemployment, these dummy variables proxy for the length of tenure on the
current job. The coefficients on the PRE-variables are therefore expected to be positive and
increasing with the time between displacement and survey, i.e., PREi > PREj, IrJ i > j.
The state unemployment rate for experienced workers in the year of displacement
as well as the trend in state unemployment are included as a measure of the economic
25 The estimated coefficients from the predisplacement wage equation are presented in Appendix D.

conditions surrounding the search ,for employment. 26 The actual unemployment rate should
enter negatively, reflecting a larger pool of applicants for each job opening. The trend should
also enter with a negative coefficient; a positive trend indicates a deteriorating economic
climate in which to conduct a job search. The inclusion of these variables also serves to
control for the "unemployment congestion" hypothesis which explains some of the observed
change in wages.

7. Results
This section presents the results of the econometric analysis of trade displaced workers. First is a discussion of unemployment duration, followed by an examination of the
changes in wages experienced by trade displaced workers.

7.1 Unemployment Duration
Referring back to Table 1, recall that individuals displaced from traded industries
appear to be susceptible to longer spells of unemployment than do workers from nontraded
industries. Given that workers from traded industries appear to be somewhat older, less
educated, more likely to be married and to have longer tenure on the predisplacement job,
it is not clear ,whether this observation is because of observable worker heterogeneity or
i

perhaps because of industry-specific effects on individuals, such as the endowment of less
valued industry-specific human capital. The analysis of this section will shed some light on
the actual source of the difference in unemployment duration. This section proceeds with a
discussion of further data restrictions followed by a discussion of the regression results.

26 The trend state unemployment rate is defined simply as the change in state unemployment rate in the year
following displacement.
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Data
The subset of the DWS used for the analysis of unemployment includes all workers
over the age of 17 at the time of displacement and currently less than 65 years of age. The
lower bound is imposed as it is assumed that individuals in the labor market aged 18 and
above are more reflective of permanent lifetime participants in the labor market, while the
upper bound merely omits those expected to be retired. The sample is further restricted to
include only those displaced from full time positions and those that reported weekly earnings
in excess of $80/week. An individual must also be an active labor market participant in order
to be included. 27

In addition, the trade price dataset used to calculate the changes in industry displacements is incomplete. There are some traded industries that are not covered by the data,
and the trade prices are not available for other industries before 1984. In order to reduce the
contamination of the results, by including possibly trade displaced workers with nontraded
workers, all workers displaced from traded industries, or in time periods, for which trade
price data do not exist, are omitted.

Results
Table 4 contains the coefficients on the trade variables from various specifications
of the unemployment durz

~n

model of equation 1. Appendix E contains the entire set

of coefficients. Specification 1, which excludes the trade variables, has been estimated in a
number of other publications. 28 It is included in Table 4 only to facilitate a comparison of the
differences in a and the log of the likelihood function.

The coefficients are comparable to

those found elsewhere, but in general are more precisely estimated because of the relatively
27 This excludes individuals reporting employment status as: keeping house, going to school, unable to work,
retired or other. These individuals are excluded because it is believed that they might exhibit artificially long
unemployment spells. A more thorough analysis might include a 2~tage model where the first stage models
the decision to drop out of the labor force. One would not expect the results for the trade variables to be
qualitatively different because of this omission.
28 See, for example, Kruse (1988), Podgursky and Swaim (1987a) and Solon (1985).

large size of this dataset. 29
Column 2 presents the results from the specification including the two traded dummy
variables: TRDDEC and TRDEXP. TRDDEC is 1 for individuals displaced from a declining traded industry, an industry in a year in which trade competition is particularly severe.
Conversely, TRDEXP is 1 for individuals displaced from an expanding traded industry. The
results are quite consistent with the univariate observations from Ta1?le 2. The positive sign
on both traded coefficients indicates that individuals separated from traded industries experience substantially longer spells of unemployment than do those displaced from nontraded
industries. As expected, displacement from declining traded industries results in unemployment spells significantly longer than those from expanding trading industries, consistent with
the conjectured nontransferability of human capital by trade displaced workers. The coefficients on TRDDEC and TRDEXP are significantly different from each other in Specification.
2 at any conventional level.
Recall from section 5 the interpretation of coefficients in Table 4. The ratio of {3 to a,
in this framework, is the proportional change in the explanatory variable. From Regression
2 then, we find that displacement from a declining traded industry leads to a 36% increase in
the expected duration of unemployment. Similarly, displacement from an expanding traded
industry results in a spell of unemployment that is 21 % longer than that exhibited by workers
displaced from.nontraded industries.
I

Regression 3 allows for a perhaps more significant test of the human capital substitutability hypothesis. Here, the two traded variables and the tenure variable have been
replaced by three cross terms; TENURE
of individuals.

*

a dummy variable for each of the three types

Using tenure on the predisplacement job as a proxy for the amount of

firm/industry specific human capital the individual has developed, these three variables
will highlight the differences in human capital depletion among workers displaced from the
three industries.
29 One exception is the coefficient on the female dummy. Here, the coefficient is small and insignificant, suggesting
that the unemployment experiences are similar for men and women. This result does not hold when individuals
who dropped out of the labor force are included in the analysis.
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Table 4
Unemployment Duration 1
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Reg 1

Variable

Reg 2

Reg 3

.289*··

TRDDEC

.217*··

(0.044)

(0.055)

.169*··

TRDEXP

.198*··

(0.050)

.011···

TENURE

(0.003)

TRDDEC

(.061)

.196*··
(0.056)

.174··
(0.062)

(.002)

* Tenure

.029*··

* Tenure

.011**
(0.004)

NonTraded

Reg 5

.009*··

(0.004)

TRDEXP

Reg 4

* Tenure

.003
(0.003)

.019*··
(0.005)

.019***
(0.004)

.004

.004

(0.004)

(0.004)

.007**
(0.003)

WDIFFD

.007**
(0.003)

.269*·
(0.106)

a

-log L
(-12,600) ,

N
N Censored

.791

.792

(0.012)

(0.012)

56.5

31.8

.793

(0.012)

(0.012)

(0.012)

40.3

28.8

7,380
1,006

A complete set of regression results is available from the author.
1Unless otherwise indicated, the coefficients are all significant at
*Significant at the 90% level.

**Significant at the 95% level.
.** Significant at the 99% level.

.792

.792

the

99%

level.
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While the results from Regression 2 did indeed suggest a different experience for
those in declining and expanding trade industries, the cross product terms with tenure
suggest a larger difference still. This increases the support for comparative advantage story.
Displacement from a declining traded industry will result in a 4% increase in the duration
of unemployment for every year of tenure, while displacement from an expanding traded
industry will result in only a 1.4% longer spell for each year of displacement. This suggests
that human capital loss is more important for traded industries generally, but is almost three
times more important for those displaced from declining traded industries.
Regression 3, vis a vis Regression 4, imposes the restriction that TRDDEC and
TRDEXP are independently unimportant. From Regression 4, however, we see that there
are factors inherent in displacement from a traded industry, expanding or contracting, that
result in a substantially longer spell of unemployment. This result can, again, be explained
in terms of the relative growth rates for traded versus nontraded industries, and the greater
depreciation of human capital that comes from crossing this line.

It is often argued that import competition is most likely to occur in industries that
pay relatively high wages. IT wages are high, this could be an indication of excess rents in
the industry. Imports are attracted by these rents, resulting in displacements. In an effort to
obtain a position which also pays such rents, the individual may set their reservation wage
inappropriately high, a higher reservation wage will result in a longer spell of unemployment.
To control for this explanation, Specification 4 includes the 3-digit interindustry wage differentials reported in Krueger and Summers (1987). The interindustry wage differential is the
premium workers receive for being employed in a particular industry. That is, the percentage
difference between the wages received in an industry and the average wage of all workers
with similar observable characteristics.
The descriptive statistics of Table 2 suggest that workers displaced from traded
industries are from industries that pay a large wage premium, Column 5 of Table 4 suggests
that there is a significant correlation between predisplacement wage premiums and the spell

of unemployment. The inclusion of the wage differential does not, however, significantly
impact the coefficients on the traded industry variables. Each of the trade-related coefficients
is smaller, but only marginally so. We can therefore rule out the argument that it is the wage
premiums that are driving the duration of unemployment rather than the traded variables.
The results of this section do suggest that, even controlling for a wide variety of
elements, individuals displaced from declining traded industries do tend to suffer from abnormally long spells of unemployment.

7.2 Postdisplacement Wages

Data
The sample of observations is a subset of those used for the analysis of unemployment
duration. The subset is chosen based on the current employment status of the individual. If
the individual is currently employed, at least part time, then she is included in the analysis.
Note that this excludes not only individuals that have not worked since displacement, but
also individuals that have worked since displacement, but have for one reason or another left
that job as well. This sample includes all observations for which reasonable current wages
are available. 3O

Results
Table 5 contains the results from the post-displacement wage regression analysis.
Recall the two statistical corrections; first, the Heckman two-step correction for selection
bias, and second, the unemployment duration variable is the predicted value from the preferred specification in the previous section. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients
reported are consistent with the results from previous studies. The coefficient on unemployment duration is negative and significant for all specifications. As in Addison and Protugal
30 Reasonable is defined by approximately S2/hour. This meaDB a minimum. wage of $40/week forparttime workers
and 580/week for full time workers in constant 1985 dollars.

Table 5
Postd ispla ceme nt Wage Equa tions
(Standa rd ErroI'B in Parenth eses)

Variable
TRDD EC
TRDE XP

Regression 1

Regression 2

0.014

-0.008

(0.013)

(0.012)

0.004

-0.004

.(0.015 )

Tenur e

0.001
(0.001)

Ln(Pr eW)

0.000

(0.013)

-0.007**
(0.001)

0.480**
(0.012)

Ln(UM"mp)

-0.045-*
(0.004)

-0.162 -(0.029)

.421
9,892

-0.050**
(0.004)

-0.141**
(0.026)

.541

Regression 3
-0.034**
(0.013)

-0.012
(0.015)

-0.016**
(0.001)

1.000
-0.056-*
(0.004)

-0.097**
(0.029)

.186

A comple te set of regression results is available from the author.
~p is the predict ed weeks ofunem ployme nt(+l) from Regress
ion 4 in Table 4.
A is the Invene Mills Ratio.
*Significant at the 95% level.
-* Significant at the 99% level.

(1988), there appea rs to be a negati ve selection, i.e., the emplo yed
indivi duals are earning
less than wouIa be expec ted from their unem ploye d count erpart
s, or in Regression 3, the
curren tly emplo yed took larger pay cuts than we would expec t to
observ e for the curren tly
unemployed.

Of prima ry intere st are the trade relate d variables. Consi stent with
the descriptive
statist ics, Specification 1 suggests that, when you do not control for
predis placem ent wages,
indivi duals displaced from declining traded indus tries have highe
r post-d isplac emen t earnings than do all others . The coefficient is, however, statist ically insign
ificant. Of secondary
impor tance, the coefficient on the tenure variab le is negat ive in
Regression 2 and 3. This
implies, as discussed in section 5, that the effects of inefficient search
outwe igh the effects of
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the wage loss due to a previous displacement.
More in keeping with prior expectations, the inclusion of the predisplacement wages
reveals that the postdisplacement wage is lower for trade displaced workers than for all other
workers; the coefficient, however, remains insignificant. Furthermore, the change in wages
for individuals from declining traded industries is negative and significantly greater than
for other displaced individuals. This is largely consistent with a more extreme depletion of
industry-specific human capital for trade displaced workers than for others.
Not consistent with the human capital substitutability is that TRDEXP and TRDDEC enter with coefficients of the same sign. While the relative magnitudes are as expected,
the original hypothesis was that the respective coefficients would be of opposite sign. This
result, as was a comparable relationship with respect to unemployment duration, can be
attributed to a higher rate of general growth for nontraded industries relative to that of
expanding traded industries.
Greater reliance is to be placed on the results of the wage-difference specification,
equation (2), because of its ability to control for unobservable individual-specific heterogeneity. Note also that the methodology used in Haveman (1992) is not particularly strong
when it comes to identifying expanding traded industries. A methodology that was better
able to identify an expansion of exports might produce the anticipated sign on TRDEXP.
Therefore, the :comparative advantage story cannot be ruled out.

8. Decomposition of Expected Unemployment Spells
As discussed in Section 3, there have been several studies examining the types of
workers displaced by trade, only one of which makes use of the DWS. Common to most
of these studies is the finding that individuals displaced by trade have a more difficult
postdisplacement experience than do other displaced workers.

The explanation for this

result is generally that these individuals possess characteristics, independent of the industry
of displacement, that result in longer than normal spells of unemployment. This section will

Table 6
Decomposition of Unemployment Duration
Expanding
Traded

Nontraded

28.2

20.1

22.0

9.4

5.3

37.6

25.4

Declining
Traded

# of Wks

Due to:

Individual Characteristics
Type of Industry
Total

22.0

utilize the results of Section 7.1 to assess the extent to which this conclusion applies to the
current dataset.
In what follows, a decomposition of the expected spell of unemployment for workers
displaced from declining traded industries, from expanding traded industries, and from nontraded industries is presented. The regression coefficients from Specification 2 of Table 4 are
used to separate the contribution of individual-specific characteristics from the contribution
of the industry of displacement, expanding or declining traded, to the expected number of
weeks of unemployment. This is followed by an accounting of the expected number of weeks
of unemployed resources caused by changes in trade throughout the 1980s.
Table 6 presents a decomposition of the expected unemployment duration into two
sources. The first source, individual-specific characteristics, is the number of weeks we would
expect the individual to be unemployed, in the absence of specific industry of displacement
effects. The second source is the expected addition to the spell of unemployment by the
category of the industry of displacement.
The total expected unemployment duration is the mean of the predicted values from
Specification 2 of Table 4. The value expressed here is the expected number of weeks absent
any censoring and is hence significantly greater than the mean number of weeks expressed
in Table 2. The expected duration for declining traded industries is approximately 12 weeks
more than the censored mean. It is plausible that the censoring mechanism reduces the mean
so dramatically given that a quarter of the observations are censored. The number of weeks

31 . "-unemployed due to individual-specific characteristics is calculated as the predicted values
absent the effects of the traded industry dummy variables. The effect of the type of industry
is then the difference between the values for total and individual-specific characteristics.
Row 1 of Table 6 confirms the results of previous studies. The demographic characteristics of workers displaced by trade do result in abnormally long spells of unemployment,
eight weeks longer than for those displaced from expanding traded industries and six weeks
longer than those from nontraded industries. The result that the characteristics of those
displaced from expanding traded industries are the least likely to result in prolonged spells
of unemployment is entirely consistent with the human capital story told in the introduction.
Individuals of the type demanded by expanding traded industries are in the highest relative
demand.

In addition to the effects of individual-specific characteristics, however, being displaced from a declining traded industry is responsible for an additional nine and a half
weeks of unemployment for these workers over and above that experienced by those from
nontraded industries. This is four weeks longer than for those displaced from expanding
traded industries. The particular type of industry-specific human capital possessed by the
workers is therefore responsible for an additional month of joblessness. That individuals
displaced from traded industries generally suffer more than those from nontraded industries
is due to the relatively rapid growth of the services sector and the greater substitutability
of the human capital within this sector than between traded and nontraded industries more
generally.
Table 7 presents an accounting of the aggregate number of weeks of unemployment
directly attributable to changes in the competitive position of the United States. The first
column presents the increase in the number of weeks of unemployment due to increased
displacements from declining traded industries while the second column presents the reduction due to the increased competitive position of, and hence reduced displacements from,
expanding traded industries.

Table 7
An Accounting of the Changes in the Number
of Weeks of Unemployment Caused.
by International Trade in the 1980s
(in Thousands of Weeks)

#

Declining
Traded

Expanding
Traded

Net
Change

Individual Characteristics

5,772

-3,129

2,643

Type of Industry

1,931

-834

1,098

Total

7,703

-3,963

3,740

181,721

-184,622

-2,901

of Wks Due to:

Number of Displacements

The values are generated by predicting, again from Specification 2 of Table 4, the
expected duration of unemployment for a.ll of the displaced workers in each industry in each
year, 1981 through 1989. The average of these values is then multiplied by the change in
the number of displacements resulting from trade in that industry and year. If the industry
experienced a greater number of displacements this value is accumulated in the Declining
Traded column. Similarly, reductions are accumulated in the Expanding Traded column.
The net effect of changing trade patterns is then presented in Column 3.
As is evident from the table, the reduction of displacements due to increased competitiveness in some industries fails to offset the increase in the number of weeks of unemployment
attributable to the decline of other traded industries. Although the net impact of trade was
to reduce the number of displacements by 2,901, the difference in expected length of joblessness results in a net increase in the number of weeks of unemployed resources by nearly four
million weeks. The bulk of this is due to the characteristics of those displaced from declining
traded industries. Individual-specific characteristics account for nearly three-fourths of the
additional weeks of unemployment, while industry-specific effects account for the remaining
on~fourth

of the increase; a net increase of over one million weeks of unemployment.

33' --9. Conclusion and Implications for Policy

This study provides an investigation into the differences in the postdisplacement
labor market experiences of workers separated from declining traded, expanding traded and
nontraded industries. The results presented provide the beginnings of a bridge across the
gap between what is known and·what is perceived regarding the allocative efficiency effects
of trade-related labor displacements.
The strategy of the paper is to relate the postdisplacement experience of individuals to changes in the competitive position of the industry from which the individual was
displaced. The investigative lens is primarily focused on the impact of changing industry
competitiveness on the duration of unemployment spells and the change in wages accompanying displacement.
The results of the previous sections provide evidence that workers in declining traded
industries experience greater hardship when displaced. It was shown that the duration of
unemployment spells was longer for those individuals, the probability of reemployment was
lower, and that once reemployed, these individuals experience a larger decline in wages than
do other displaced workers.
It has been suggested elsewhere that this was merely a result of the characteristics

of the displaced workers, i.e., trade displaced workers are more likely to be female, black,
and less skilleq..31 If this assertion is correct, then the argument for specific relief of trade
displaced workers, e.g., TAA, is diminished. This assertion is, however, inconsistent with
the results presented above. Both the results for unemployment duration and changes in
wages suggest that trade displaced workers suffer to a greater degree because they are: trade
displaced. The simple explanation put forth in the introduction, that trade displaced workers
are endowed with a large proportion of particularly useless industry-specific human capital
is quite consistent with this result.
The implication is therefore that if assistance to displaced workers is to be most
productive, i. e., directed towards those most in need, targeting trade displaced workers
31

See Tyson et aI.

(1988),

pg. 80.

would seem to be appropriate. Indeed, the results suggest beneficial effects of trade-related
assistance based on both distributional equity and allocative efficiency grounds. The evidence
presented reveals a loss of income to those displaced because of trade which exceeds the
income gains to those remaining employed because of an increased competitive position
of their industry. Combined with the benefits to consumers of freer trade, distributional
considerations suggest some assistance in the form of income maintenance is warranted.
The accounting undertaken in Section 8 goes further to present an argument based
on allocative efficiency for assistance. The findings presented reveal that even when the
increased employment in expanding traded industries is considered, there is a considerable
increase in the quantity of unemployed resources resulting from the adjustment to changes
in international competitiveness. It would seem that job retraining or job search assistance
would also be a reasonable response to combat the allocative efficiency effects, J.e., unemployment of resources resulting from changes in international competition.

In addition to the evidence in favor of trade-related assistance, the results presented
here provide support for using this methodology, or some refined version of it to identify,

ex ante, trade impacted workers. It would seem that the use of such a methodology would
improve on the petition and response system currently in place. While this methodology can
be implemented only with significant lags, the current system does not provide especially
timely response to petitions. The results of this study also provide evidence that a program
based on this methodology would, on average, provide assistance to those in greatest need.

· ~-
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· '"APPENDIX A

DECOMPOSITION OF THE CHANGE IN DISPLACEMENTS BY
INDUSTRY AND YEAR

• iio.

Table A.2
Breakdown of Displacements by Year
for 1981 through 1989

Displacements
Change due to:
Year

Actual.

X+M

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

378933
574594
689962
540342
712690

Sub-Total

Export Price

Import Price

62572
30770
11014
4987
5505

-1531
-377
28
-1071
-1581

64102
31147
10986
6058
7086

2896521

114848

-4532

119379

1986
1987
1988
1989

447284
430524
335283
419601

-60573
-51955
-16449
11140

-846
988
-1050
-1138

-59727
-52944
-15399
12278

Sub-Total

1632692

-117837

-2046

-115792

Total

4529213

-2991

-6578

3587

